This was caused by complete disdain for procedure in the headquarters of the 2nd Russian Army and failure of front-line radio communications in the Russian chain of command. Russian army intelligence failed to disclose the concentration of the main forces of the 8th German Army against the flanks of the Samsonov Army. The main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Army were completely unsatisfactory command from the headquarters of the North-Western Front, who failed to correctly assess the operational situation in the period of August 20-26, as well as the mistakes of army commander General Samsonov, who unreasonably widened the army’s offensive line, and failed to provide operational control of army units during the ensuing battle. The new command of the 8th German Army decided to take advantage of the gap formed between the Russian armies to inflict flanking blows on the 2nd Samsonov army, encircle it and destroy it. The command of the Russian Army also considered the operation in East Prussia basically complete and worked on an offensive plan to take the interior of Germany. The Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army, Samsonov, in turn, decided to intercept the retreat of Germans, and insisted before the command of the front on transferring the main contingent of his army from the north to the north-west direction, which led to the Russian armies advancing in different directions and between them a huge gap formed. The main forces of the First Rennenkampf Army were not directed toward the Second Army of Samsonov, but on the intersecting of city of Koenigsberg, where part of the 8th German Army was allegedly concealed under the assumption of an offensive. They thought that the Germans were retiring beyond the Vistula, and considered the military operation to be completed, and changed the initial plan. However, the implementation of the plan entirely depended on the actions of the Rennenkampf army, whose rapid advance to the west, according to Ludendorff, would make the maneuver unthinkable.Īt this time, the command of the North-Western Russian Front discovered a rapid retreat of German troops. It was decided to deploy 2.5 divisions against the 1st Russian army along the railway through Koenigsberg, and to transfer the main forces of the 8th Army against the 2nd Russian army of Samsonov and try to defeat it before it merged with units of the First Army. They arrived at the headquarters of the 8th Army on August 23,and approved a plan to repel the Russian offensive against East Prussia. On August 21, Moltke removed Prittwitz and his chief of staff, General Waldersee, and appointed Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich von Ludendorff in their place. However, this decision was opposed and, contrary to the plan of Schlieffen, who, due to the unfavorable development of events on the Eastern Front, demanded a retreat to the heartland of Germany but in no case withdraw troops from the Western Front, in order to assure the defeat France and avoid a war on two fronts. The defeat at Gumbinnen created a real threat of encirclement of the Eighth German Army, and on the evening of August 20, Prittwitz decided to retreat. As a result, Prittwitz, fearful of encirclement, decided to retreat and abandon the entire territory of East Prussia. In the flank and rear, was the 2nd army of Samsonov. The 8th German Army, commanded by Colonel-General Prittwitz, was defeated on August 20, in a battle near Gumbinen. The 1st Army under the command of General PK Rennenkampf, and the 2nd Army, under the command of General AV Samsonov. The Russian offensive was carried out by the forces of two armies. However, the Russian army unexpectedly mobilized quickly and created an offensive on the Eastern Front, thus putting Germany in a bad position. It was assumed that during this time the German army would be able to inflict heavy casualties in France and capture Paris, and then attack Russia. The Schlieffen plan, which was the basis of the German strategy to win in the First World War, was created from the assumption that the Russian army would delay deployment for necessary mobilization. The Battle of Tannenberg, August 26-30, 1914 was between Russian and German troops during the East Prussian operation in the First World War.
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